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Improving Checklist Use 
USING GRAPHIC FEEDBACK TO ELIMINATE CHECKLIST SEGMENT TIMING ERRORS 
William G. Rantz 
Abstract 
This study examined whether pilots initiated paper or digital checklist use from environmental prompts 
accurately when they receive post-flight graphic and limited verbal feedback. Participants were 6 college students who 
are pilots with instrument rating. The task consisted of flying a designated flight pattern using a Frasca 241 Cirrus 
Flight Training Device. The dependent variable was the percentage of paper and digital checklist segments initiated 
at the proper time. A single-subject, alternating treatment, multiple baseline design with withdrawal and delayed 
probes was employed in this study. During baseline, participants were given only post-flight technical skills feedback. 
During intervention, participants were given both technical skills feedback and post-flight graphic feedback on both 
paper and digital checklist use and praise for improvements. A probe was used between 60-90 days to assess any 
decrement in participant's performance. The intervention produced highly improved paper and digital checklist timing 
performance, which improved to nearly perfect following the withdrawal of treatment and increased to perfect 
performance through the probe sessions. 
Introduction 
In aviation, the checklist is used during different 
segments of flight to sequence specific, time critical tasks 
and aircraft configuration adjustments that correspond to 
specific environmental demands (Degani & Wiener, 1990). 
It is divided into sub-sections with task checklists that 
correspond to all flight segments and, in particular, critical 
segments such as take off, approach, and landing. 
The complexity of these task checklists cannot be 
overstated. Standard procedures common to some cockpits 
are not compatible with other cockpits or with newer 
generation cockpits. Additionally, the task lists can be very 
long. For example, on some checklists, the "before engine 
start" sub-section has 76 items for the first flight of the day, 
and 37 items for subsequent flight segments (Degani & 
Wiener, 1990). Thus, it is not surprising that many aviation 
experts have addressed their importance and design, as well 
as the practices and policies that surround their use 
(Adamski & Stahl, 1997; Degani, 1992, 2002; Degani & 
Wiener 1990; Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 
1995, 2000; Gross 1995; Turner, 2001). Even so, the 
incorrect use of flight checklists is still often cited as the 
probable cause or a contributing factor to a large number of 
crashes (Degani, 2002; Degani & Wiener, 1990; Diez, 
Boehm-Davis, & Holt, 2003; Turner, 2001). Crew errors 
have been recorded by observers using the Line Oriented 
Safety Audit that recorded checklist behaviors throughout 
the flight (Helmreich, n.d.; Helmreich, Klinect, Wilhelm, & 
Jones, 1999; Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001). 
Between 1997 and 1998, LOSAs were conducted at three 
airlines with 184 flight crews on 314 flight segments. 
Seventy-three percent of the flight crews committed errors. 
The number of errors ranged fkom zero to fourteen per 
flight, with an average of two. Rule-compliance errors were 
the most frequently occurring errors, accounting for fifty- 
four percent of all errors (Helmreich, n.d.; Helmreich et al., 
2001). Checklist errors constituted the highest number of 
errors in this category. Similarly, many investigations by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have revealed 
that the aircraft were not properly configured for flight, 
which usually results from improper checklist use (NTSB, 
1969, 1975, 1982, 1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1990,1997, 1998, 
2001, 2002, 2003% 2003b, 2004% 2004b, 2006, 2007% 
2007b, 2008% 2008b, 2008c, 2008d). 
Checklist devices or methods of presentations are 
described as paper, laminated paperlcard, scroll paper, 
electromechanical, vocal, and computer-aided/electronic. 
The most common method of presentation for checklists is 
- 
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the laminated paperlcard (Degani & Wiener, 1993; Turner 
& Huntley, 1991). While this statement may be true for all 
general aviation aircraft manufactured in the last one 
hundred years, the rise of lower cost computing hardware 
and software is rapidly changing how newer aircraft present 
checklists (Boorman, 2001% 2001b). Within the last two 
decades, electronic or digital checklists have appeared on 
many regional and major airline flight decks, and their use 
is rapidly increasing in some general aviation aircraft. These 
digital checklists are integrated into the new aircraft panel 
by the manufacturer with software designed to exclude 
many paper checklist errors observed in past studies (Arkell, 
2006; Boorman, 2001% 2001 b). In Degani and Wiener 
(1 990), they found 
the current paper checklists have a 
number of design weaknesses. These 
problems included the lack of a pointer to 
the current checklist item, the inability to 
mark a skipped item, and difficulties in 
getting lost while switching between 
checklists. The field study on paper 
checklists identified a number of 
problems with paper checklists that may 
be alleviated with the use of an electronic 
checklist. (p. 2) 
While the claim that using electronic checklists 
over traditional paper checklists will reduce or eliminate 
most paper checklist errors may be true, Boorman was 
concerned that without an automated alarm to alert pilots, 
even the electronic checklist will not prevent omitted 
checklists (Boorman, 2001a, p. 5). Thus, certain errant 
behavior of the pilot is still a source of consternation to the 
human factors engineer which automation may not cure. 
Since Boorman's study was a review of accident data and 
not an empirical study comparing the different performances 
resulting fi-om different checklist presentations, its 
generality is limited. However Boorman states: 
Significant changes in crew training, pilot 
demographics, airplane technology, and 
the air traffic environment have and will 
continue to take place. Will the context of 
checklist errors, and indeed checklists, be 
significantly altered in the future? An 
answer to this question is available: the 
fundamental role of checklists, to ensure 
that critical crew actions are 
accomplished at critical points in a flight, 
is likely to remain valid; and decreasing 
the chance of errors in the 
accomplishment of those actions will 
continue to benefit flight safety. (p. 6) 
As avionics prices continue to decline, it is very 
likely more digital checklists will be installed on smaller 
general aviation aircraft, thereby expanding the 
demographics of the pilot users &om airline professional to 
recreational novice. It is still challenging to ensure pilots 
understand that the checklist is a textual presentation 
method by which flight deck safety is enhanced. 
There is limited theoretical discourse regarding 
methods to improve checklist behavior using behavioral 
interventions. Rantz (2002) outlines one potential design 
concept that uses antecedents, targeted behavior, and 
consequences to address poor checklist performance and 
crew performance. A recent study by Rantz, Dickinson, 
Sinclair, and Van Houten (2009) demonstrated a behavioral 
intervention designed to increase the appropriate use of 
flight checklists. Rantz et al. examined eight instrument- 
rated students fi-om an accredited collegiate flight program 
by measuring paper checklists errors using a personal 
computer aviation training device (PC-ATD). Participants 
used a Cessna C-172 paper flight checklist while flying 
radar vectors fi-om takeoff to an instrument landing system 
approach and landing. During baseline, overall average 
checklist items were completed correctly 53% of the time. 
After a behavioral intervention of graphic feedback and 
praise for checklist improvement, performance improved to 
98% items correct. Once feedback was withdrawn, 
performance remained high until the end of the study, with 
an average of 99% items correct. The importance of this 
study is the focus on changing the behavior of the pilots 
regarding checklist use. 
In this study, post-flight graphic feedback 
and praise increased checklist compliance 
to near perfect levels. This is the first 
time this type of behavioral intervention 
has been used to alter checklist use. 
(Rantz et al., 2009, p. 20) 
From the accident reports and LOSA data, errors in 
using traditional paper or digital checklists have and 
continue to plague the industry. Given the number of 
aviation studies devoted to checklist use and how tasks are 
conducted on the flight deck, an extensive search of the 
aviation checklist literature revealed only one study that has 
examined (a) whether the traditional paper checklist could 
be used as a dependent variable, and (b) whether behavioral 
interventions could increase the appropriate use of flight 
checklists (Rantz et al., 2009). 
The future challenge seems to be developing 
reliable training curricula which recognize and reinforce 
checklist use regardless of its presentation method. Training 
methods must consider the occasional misguided attending 
behavior of the pilot or the lack of stimuli prompt 
recognition. While misguided attending behavior or 
distractions absolutely increase the risk in not recognizing 
checklist prompts, so to does the lack of consistent training 
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and reinforcement in developing reliable checklist prompt 
comprehension. Both misguided attending behavior and 
prompt comprehension may contribute to the low 
performance of consistent checklist use as observed in the 
LOSA data. This study attempts to improve both paper and 
digital checklist errors and thereby improve checklist 
segment timing. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were six undergraduate students 
enrolled in collegiate commercial flight courses. Participants 
volunteered from the commercial ground class which is 
taken after the private certificate and the instrument rating 
is earned. No monetary compensation was given to 
participate in the study. During the study participants 
maintained anonymity between fellow participants, flight 
instructors, and faculty. Criteria for inclusion included a 
private pilot certificate, instrument rating, and having 
experience in either a Frasca 241 and have at least been 
checked out for solo using actual flight time in the Cirrus 
SR20 aircraft. Participants averaged 186 total flight hours of 
which an average of 80 hours were in the Cirrus aircraft or 
FTD. 
Setting 
The Flight Training Devise (FTD) and observation 
camera equipment was located in a hanger used exclusively 
to train collegiate flight students. Within the FTD area, 
enclosed structures restricted the vision of the participant to 
only the simulator. Neither the observation area nor 
equipment, excluding the video cameras, were visible to the 
participants. 
Apparatus 
The Frasca 24 1 FTD equipment was produced by 
Frasca International in Champaign, IL. The aircraft shell 
consists of the Cirrus aircraft forward cowling and flight 
deck with operating doors. The flight deck is open aft of the 
fi-ont seats to allow for observation during training near the 
instructor station. The graphic instructor station (GIST) 
software permitted the simulation of both the SR20 and the 
SR22 aircraft. The Cirrus SR20 was chosen due to its 
increasing popularity in general aviation as well as the fact 
that it was the primary aircraft used in the collegiate training 
fleet. The GIST simulation software automatically recorded 
technical flight skill parameters, such as vertical and 
horizontal progress and enabled those tracks to be printed 
for technical skills feedback. 
Flightpatterns. For random variability there were 
six different flight patterns used for this study (Appendix 
A). Each flight pattern was divided into eight segments: (a) 
before takeoff, (b) normal takeoff, (c) climb, (d) cruise, (e) 
descent, (f) before landing, (g) after landing, and @I) 
shutdown. Each segment corresponds to the eight checklist 
segments used for each radar vectored instrument approach 
flight. To realistically simulate actual flight patterns and 
insure that the patterns were flown in a consistent way 
across trials and participants, the experimenter provided 
typical air traffic control instructions throughout each flight 
pattern. These scripted instructions were transmitted using 
a headset system. 
The flight checklist. The digital and paper 
checklists each contained 70 identical checklist items 
divided into sections that corresponded to each of the eight 
flight segments. Using the Cirrus checklist ensures the 
aircraft is properly configured for the appropriate phase of 
flight. Each checklist segment must be completed at certain 
moments in time, which should be standardized fiom flight 
to flight. 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable was the presence or 
absence of post-flight (a) graphic feedback on the total 
number of checklist items completed correctly per flight, (b) 
graphic feedback on the number of items completed 
correctly, completed incorrectly, or omitted for each of the 
eight flight segments per flight and (c) praise for 
improvement in the number of checklist items completed 
correctly. 
Dependent Variables 
The main dependent variable was the overall 
average percentage of paper and digital checklist segments 
participants completed incorrectly per flight. For an item to 
be scored "correct," participants had to respond, or begin to 
use the appropriate checklist segment at the appropriate time 
during the flight. 
Experimental Design 
A single-subject, alternating treatment, multiple 
baseline design with withdrawal and delayed probe was 
employed in this study. The intervention was introduced to 
the participants at different times, only after it was apparent 
that baseline performance was stable. The power of the 
design assumes if a baseline changes after the intervention 
was given, the effect can be attributed to the intervention 
and not extraneous variables. This design was chosen for 
several reasons; (a) the ability to making causal statements, 
(b) relatively small number of participants required, (c) 
visually demonstrate independent effects of intervention, (d) 
visually demonstrate the magnitude and applied significance 
of the intervention (Kazdin, 1982). Sessions lasted 
approximately two hours, and participants flew four 
different flight patterns in each session. Each flight was 
considered a trial. The order of exposure to the six flight 
patterns was randomized for each participant to ensure no 
flight pattern was repeated during any one session. A 
withdrawal of treatment phase was included to assess 
whether checklist timing segment performance would be 
maintained after the post-flight feedback was withdrawn. A 
probe phase between sixty and ninety days was used to see 
if there was a long term decline in checklist segment timing 
performance. 
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Procedures 
Baseline Phase. Participants were informed their 
behavior during each flight trial would be observed and 
recorded using the pre-positioned video cameras as well as 
an observer checklist (Appendix B). For each flight trial 
they were given automated terminal information concerning 
the weather and airport conditions, the Cirrus approved 
paper checklist, as well as the official ILS approach plate 
used to execute the instrument approach. Before the 
beginning of each session of four trials, a digital or paper 
checklist was randomly assigned for the first trial and the 
remaining three trials alternated between paper and digital 
checklists. Additionally, they were told that the 
experimenter would provide them with some post-flight 
information alter each flight and that it would take him 
about 5 minutes to prepare that material. 
After the participant completed a flight, the 
experimenter printed out the vertical and horizontal flight 
path just flown by the participant. This provided the 
participant with technical flight skills feedback one would 
expect in a normal simulator instruction session. No 
comments were made regarding the previous checklist use. 
The technical diagram was reviewed with the participant. 
This protocol was repeated for each flight during the 
baseline phase. 
Intervention Phase. In addition to giving 
participants the technical diagram feedback that depicted 
critical flight parameters after each flight, the experimenter 
provided graphic feedback on the use of the flight checklist. 
After each flight trial, the experimenter immediately 
calculated the number of checklist items completed 
correctly, entered it into the computer, and printed a line 
graph that displayed the number of correctly completed 
items for each trial, including the accumulated trials the 
participant had completed during baseline (Figure 1). All 
data to the left of the vertical dotted line in Figure 1 
represent baseline performance and all data to the right of 
the vertical dotted line represent intervention performance. 
The experimenter also entered the number of checklist items 
completed correctly, completed incorrectly, and omitted for 
each of the eight flight segments for that particular flight, 
and printed a bar graph that displayed those data. The bar 
graph also included the total number of possible correct 
checklist items for each segment as well (Figure 2). The 
experimenter first showed the technical flight diagram to the 
participant and discussed the technical merits of the flight. 
He then showed the two checklist feedback graphs to the 
participants and praised any improvements. No detailed 
feedback was given to the participant, such as which 
particular checklist item(s) were performed as incorrect or 
omitted or errors on timing of checklist segments. This 
protocol was repeated for each flight during intervention. 
Once a participant reached 95% correct for all checklist 
items, for three consecutive trials in either paper or digital, 
the intervention phase was terminated. 
Withdrawal Phase. This phase was identical to the 
baseline phase in which only technical feedback was given 
to the participant. Graphic feedback was no longer provided 
for checklist performance after each flight. 
60-90 Day Post-Test Probe. An over 60 day probe 
past the end of the withdrawal phase was used to assess 
performance decrements over longer periods of non- 
exposure to the feedback condition. Four alternating trials 
were done using both paper checklists (2) and digital 
checklists (2). Only technical feedback was given. 
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Participant - - ltems Completed Correctly 
Black Dots=Digital ChecklisUBlue Triangles~Paper Checklist 
Figure 1. Line feedback graph of both paper and digital checklist items performed correctly. 
O C B  , , , 
Participant- Session- Trial- Paper- Diiital- 
I 
.Total ltems 
(0 Correct 
Olncorrect 
OOm~tted 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Trials 
Before Normal Climb Cruise Descent Before A M  Landing Shut D m  Total 
Takeoff Takeoff Landing 
Figure 2. Bar feedback graph of one trial during intervention. 
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Data collection took approximately 64 sessions 
which included 256 flight trials. 2,45 1 total paper checklist 
errors were observed and 2,562 total digital checklist e m  
were observed. During the study 75 paper segment timing 
errors occurred while 66 digital segment timing errors 
occurred. Due to the experimental design, homogeneity 
could not be maintained regarding the number of trials 
within phases between participants. Therefore result 
comparisons are expressed in percent of error. 
Table 1 lists each participant, under which are 
columns for baseline (B), intervention (I), and withdrawal 
(W) phases. The probe phase is not listed since no timing 
errors occurred during that phase. Only paper checklist 
segments which resulted in segment timing errors are list on 
the left. The bottom row is the average percent error of each 
participant's checklist segment performance within each 
phase. While this percent is not of much use for actual 
performance feedback to the participant, it can be used to 
compare between participants' performance. This 
comparison illustrates the variability of performance 
between participants during baseline it also shows, 
excluding participant 1, the reduction in segment timing 
error during the intervention phase. All paper checklist 
segment timing errors were eliminated during the 
withdrawal and probe phase. 
Table 1. Participants Paper Checklist Segment Timing Errors Per Phase 
B I W B I W B I W B  I W B I W B I W  
Climb 0 0 0 67% 13% 0 22% 0 0 0 17% 0 50% 0 0 92% 0 0 
Cruise 0 2 0 % 0 1 7 % 0  0 1 1 % 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 % 0 0  
Descent 20% 0 0 50% 13% 0 33% 17% 0 56% 17% 0 67% 0 0 33% 0 0 
Before 
Landing 20% 20% 0 0 13% 0 67% 17% 0 56% 17% 0 75% 0 0 17% 0 0 
Data fiom Table 2 represents the same performance One exception was participant 2 in which one timing error 
measures as Table 1 except it is displaying digital checklist did occur in the descent segment during the withdrawal 
segment timing errors across each participant per phase. As phase. However all participants eliminated digital checklist 
with paper checklist, similar performance occurred for segment timing errors during the probe phase. 
participants across each phase using the digital checklist. 
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Table 2. Participants Digital Checklist Segment Timing Errors Per Phase 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
B I W B  I W B I W B  I W B I W B I W  
Climb 0 0 0 33% 0 0 22% 0 0 0 0 0 25% 0 0 50% 0 0 
Cruise 20% 20% 0 17% 0 0 11% 0 0 11% 0 0 8% 0 0 17% 0 0 
Descent 40% 20% 0 17% 13% 17% 67% 0 0 33% 17% 0 75% 0 0 0 0 0 
Before 
Landing 20% 20% 0 0 13% 0 67% 0 0 56% 17% 0 75% 0 0 33% 0 0 
rNDIV 
AVG% 20% 15% 0 17% 6% 4% 42% 0 0 25% 8% 0 46% 0 0 25% 0 0 
per Phase 
Figure 3 displays the overall average percentage 
of paper checklist segment timing errors for all 
participants over all trials. For all the paper checklist 
trials, no segment timing errors were observed for the 
Before Takeoff, Normal Takeoff, After Landing, and 
Shutdown segments. Therefore these segments were 
excluded from the graph. The paper checklist had the 
highest overall average percentage of timing errors during 
the descent phase at 43 percent error over all trials. The 
before landing had a 39 percent timing error rate followed 
by the climb segment with a 38 percent timing error rate. 
The lowest timing error rate was for the cruise segment at 
9 percent. Participants decreased the segment timing error 
rates and increased performance accuracy over baseline 
when post-flight checklist feedback was provided. During 
the intervention phase the timing error rate for the before 
landing phase was the highest at 11 percent. The 
remaining segments showed improved performance with 
reduced timing error rates for the descent (8%), climb 
(5%), and the cruise (3%). Again, all segment timing 
errors had been eliminated during the withdrawal phase as 
no timing e m  occurred after the graphic feedback 
intervention was removed or during the over 60 day 
probe. 
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probe, participants may have forgotten or ignored the 
prompts during the baseline phase or they may have 
believed nothing aversive or bad would happen to them 
while operating in a simulated flight environment and chose 
to proceed in the most familiar manner possible. 
A review of the collegiate private pilot training 
curriculum revealed that training checklist use specifically 
occurred during lessons 1-6 with level 1 for specific 
performance criteria standards of checklist use and level 2 
for preflight procedures for lesson 18-19. Performance 
criteria standards are listed in Appendix C. However the 
manual contained no evidence articulating formal follow up 
assessment or feedback specifically for checklist use. A 
further review of the collegiate instrument pilot training 
curriculum showed checklist use was required during most 
of the lessons. It appears that greater emphasis is being 
placed on using and holding a higher criteria standard for 
checklist use; however as with the private pilot curriculum, 
there is no requirement for formal follow up assessment or 
feedback specifically for checklist use during either 
instructional of non-instructional flight. 
Depending on the location of the aircraft during a 
particular flight, salient stimuli should be obvious to the 
flight crews that would prompt the start of particular 
checklist segments. The Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) 
(2003) for the Cirrus SR20 contains descriptors identifying 
specific environmental stimuli for checklist prompts. Those 
checklist segments include, a) before starting engine, paired 
stimuli-prior to engine start, b) engine start, paired stimuli- 
start engine, c) before taxi, paired stimuli-prior to taxi, d) 
taxing, paired stimuli-during taxilafter taxi, e) before 
takeoff, paired stimuli-at end of runwaylin run up area and 
prior to takeoff, f) takeoff, paired stimuli-prior to takeoff, g) 
climb, paired stimuli-1000 feet above the ground, h) cruise, 
paired stimuli-reaching desired or assigned cruise altitude, 
I) descent, paired stimuli-top of the descent into the 
destination, j) before landing, paired stimuli-for visual flight 
rules, downwind leg, for instrument flight rules, 2 nautical 
miles prior to final approach fix, k) after landing, paired 
stimuli-after clearing active runway, 1) shutdown, paired 
stimuli-ready to shutdown. Perhaps while reading the Cirrus 
SR20 POH, pilots memorize these prompts, again no 
evidence of assessing the understanding of these prompts 
could be found in the curricular documents. Similar studies 
in behavior-based safety research have observed that using 
antecedents alone, or rules designed to improve safe 
behavior are not as effective as one would expect (Austin, 
Alvero, & Olson, 1998; Engerman, Austin, & Bailey, 1997; 
Ludwig & Geller, 1997; Olson & Austin, 2001; Streff, 
Kalsher, & Geller, 1993). Thus, rule statements regarding 
the importance of consistent checklist use may be, at best, 
problematic. Given this condition, combined with the 
difficulty of finding checklist rule statements within the 
training lessons and no periodic checklist assessments, 
unclear rule-based objectives for proper checklist use may 
result in poor performance regardless of the checklist 
presentation format. 
Only the line and bar graphic feedback (Figures 1 
& 2) and limited praise for improvement was given to the 
participants. Specific verbal feedback accentuating which 
items were missed and which environmental prompts were 
needed to improve segment timing were not provided to the 
participants. During the post-flight period, participants 
examined and compared what the graphs indicated with 
what they recalled from their most recent performance. For 
example if the bar graph (Figure 2) indicated they had 
incorrectly completed all 6 items of the descent checklist, 
yet they recollected that they had actually completed all 6 
items in the descent checklist, this likely resulted in the 
participant making a rule statement. One such statement 
may have been, "I know I did all 6 checklist items in the 
descent as required yet the graph indicates those 6 items as 
being done incorrectly. The only possible conclusion to get 
all 6 items incorrect is to begin the descent checklist at the 
wrong time". This likely explains the error reduction effects 
during the intervention phase where timing errors were not 
immediately eliminated. Repeated trials using trial and error 
may have given the participant time to reason out the new 
rule statements and perhaps given those more lasting new 
rule impressions for future checklist use. While vague 
feedback may not seem to be the most efficient method to 
correct errors, it may have a profound effect on longer term 
maintenance of correct behavior. 
The only problematic overall error rate of 3 percent 
timing error occurred while using the digital checklist in the 
descent segment of the withdrawal phase. While this is a 
very low overall average timing error, it may indicate some 
timing difficulty such as a distraction while using the digital 
checklist prior to the descent. However the end results 
demonstrated complete elimination of all digital checklist 
segment timing errors during the post 60 day probes. Since 
all participants eliminated all timing errors during the 60 day 
probes; was it due to the contingency shaping caused by the 
graphic feedback, new rule statements, recalling old rule 
statements, or a combination of them all? There is strong 
evidence that the applied significance of the intervention 
reached criteria for proper timing for both paper and digital 
checklist. This accomplishment is evident given that all 
segment timing errors were eliminated by the end of the 
study. 
Given the results of the current study, more 
research is required to determine, to what extent new rules 
form under a feedback intervention and specifically how 
those new rules influence long term checklist behavior. 
Possible future research should pair a modified checklist 
curriculum, employing periodic assessment of checklist use 
and graphic feedback in simulated or actual flight. 
Since this study was conducted in a normal 
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workload environment, further study should examine 
increasing the workload demands of the pilots to determine 
if increased distractions cause higher errors using either 
paper or digital checklists. Even while operating in a normal 
workload condition, many timing errors occurred during 
elevated workload segments of the checklist. Generally 
these segments included the climb, descent and before 
landing portions. Providing increased workload may reveal 
greater differences in checklist performance given how the 
checklist is presented. Increased workload may also evaluate 
the effectiveness of the feedback intervention package 
regarding initial effect sizes and duration of effect. 
While both paper and digital checklists have their 
strengths, the inherent potential weakness of each are 
comprised of, a) the lack of pre-existing effective rule 
statements regarding the consistent and proper use of the 
checklist, b) the lack of salient stimuli recognition to prompt 
the beginning of each checklist and, c) the lack of effective 
reinforcers to increase and maintain checklist use. 
The use of line and bar graphic feedback had a 
direct effect on improving timing performance in both paper 
and digital checklist formats. Given these results and the 
importance of checklist use in the industry, flight training 
professionals should review curricular methods used to, 
educate, assess, and reinforce checklist use..) 
William G. Rantz holds a Ph.D. in Psychology, a Master of Arts in IndustriaUOrganizational Psychology, a Master of Arts in 
Career and Technical Education, and a Bachelor of Science, all from Western Michigan University. He is an associate professor 
at the College of Aviation, Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Dr. Rantz holds an Airline Pilot Certificate 
and a Multi-engine, Instrument, Flight Instructor Certificate. 
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Appendix A 
NORMAL WORKLOAD-Technical Flight Pattern Parameters and Narration 
Flight Pattern 2 KAZO 
(EXPERIMENTER): Session start, please begin. Contact tower when reaGfy for takeof 
Using flow pattern-Before Takeoff checks completed (3 1 checklist items) 
(PARTICIPANT): Kalamazoo Tower Western 45 ready for departure runway 35. 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 you are cleared for departure. Fly runway heading climb and maintain 3,500 '. 
(PARTICIPANT): Fly runway heading climb and maintain 3,500' Western 45 
Using do-list-Normal Takeoff checks completed (5 checklist items) 
After reaching 1000' AGL 
Using flow pattern-Climb checks com~leted above 1000' (5 checklist items) 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 contact Kalamazoo Approach on 121.2. 
(PARTICIPANT): Contacting Kalamazoo Approach on 121.2 Western 45. 
(PARTICIPANT): Kalamazoo Approach Western 45 is with you heading 350 climbing to 3,500'. 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 roger. 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left heading of 260. 
(PARTICIPANT): Turning left to a heading of 260 Western 45. 
Using flow pattern-Cruise checks complete after level at 3.500' (5 checklist items) 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left heading of 170 and descend to 3,000 '. 
(PARTICIPANT): Turning left to a heading of 170 and descending to 3,000 ' Western 45. 
Using flow pattern-Descent checks complete prior to IAP and 3,000' (6 checklist items) 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left to a heading of 080. 
(PARTICIPANT): Turning left to a heading of 080 Western 45. 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left to a heading of 030 cleared for the ILS 35 contact Kalamazoo Tower 118.3. 
(PARTICIPANT): Contacting Kalamazoo Tower on 11 8.3 Western 45. 
(PARTICIPANT): Kalamazoo Tower this is Western 45 on the ZLS 35. 
(OBSERVER: Western 45 you are cleared to land runway 35. 
(PARTICIPANT): Cleared to land runway 35 Western 45. 
Using flow pattern-Before Landing checks complete prior to FAF (5 checklist items) 
2 miles outside FAF-Power 50% 22" MP, flaps 50%, airspeed 100 knots, maintain 2,500' until established on the glide slope. 
FAF inbound and established on glide slope-Power 25% 12" MP, flaps 50%, airspeed 100 knots, descent rate of 500 feet per 
minute is established. 
Short final-Power as required, flaps loo%, airspeed 75 knots over threshold of runway. 
(EXPERIMENTER): Western 45 turn left to exit the active runway andpark 
Using flow pattern-After Landing checks (6 items) 
Usinn do-list-Shutdown checks (7 items) 
(EXPERIMENTER): This session is over. Please relax and I will join you in a few minutes. 
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Appendix C 
Performance Criteria Standards 
Level 0 - Unsatisfactory Performance 
Knowledge - Student lacks an understanding or is experiencing difficulty with the concepts, skills, or procedures for 
accomplishing the basic elements or maneuvers. The student achieves less than 60% on written or oral tests. 
Performance - Instructor intervention is required. Student is unable to accomplish the elements of the maneuver or is 
unsafe while performing them even after re-teaching. Such minimal performance is a bar to further progress. 
Level 1 - Instructor Demonstration - Student Performance 
Knowledge - Student begins to understand concepts, skills, or procedures for 
accomplishing the basic elements or maneuvers. The student can achieve at least 60% on mitten or oral tests. 
Performance - Student accomplishes elements or maneuvers by way of instructor direction, teaching, or re-teaching, and 
with occasional instructor intervention. 
Level 2 - Understanding with Occasional Instructor Assistance 
Knowledge - Student demonstrates a 70% mastery of referenced material on written or oral tests, usually applies 
concepts, skills, or procedures for accomplishing the basic elements or maneuvers. 
Performance - The student understands and safely demonstrates elements and maneuvers consistently to within double 
the standards found in the appropriate PTS with occasional instructor assistance. The student only needs additional 
practice to meet PTS standards. 
Level 3 - PTS Standard 
Knowledge - Student consistently demonstrates a minimum 80% mastery of referenced material on written or oral tests; 
explanation of the elements and objectives of maneuvers; voluntarily evaluates and critiques hisher personal 
performance. 
Performance - Student consistently applies concepts and skills to accomplish lesson elements and maneuvers to 
standards as referenced by the current PTS with minimal assistance and no instructor intervention. The student critiques 
and evaluates personal performance. 
Level 4 - Associating Knowledge to new Situations - Mastery of the Lesson 
Knowledge - Student consistently demonstrates exceptional performance in both written and oral testing above and 
beyond PTS. Student consistently demonstrates a minimum 90% mastery of referenced material on written or oral tests, 
explanation of the elements and the objectives of maneuvers. 
Performance - Student consistently correlates concepts and skills, and demonstrates exceptional performance above and 
beyond PTS. The student demonstrates attitude, ethics, and communication skills essential for professional flight crew 
interaction. 
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